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JUSTICE AND THE FELONIOUS ATTORNEY
Scott DeVito, J.D., Ph.D.*
The Lawyer "stands 'as a shield' . . in defense of
right and to ward off wrong. From a profession
charged with such responsibilities there must be
exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high
sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have,
throughout the centuries, been compendiously
described as 'moral character."'




On a bleary winter night, Lee Keller King, in a drunken
rage, emptied his pistol into two men, nearly killing them.2 At
trial, he pled guilty to one count of attempted murder.3 The
Texas court initially sentenced King to seven years.4
However, after four months in jail, the court recognized that
the shooting was inconsistent with King's character,
suspended his sentence, and placed him on probation.5 In the
* S. DeVito, commercial litigation associate, Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman and
Balint, P.C. I thank Justice Michael D. Ryan, James E. Barton II, and Karen E.
Cummo for their insightful comments on previous drafts of this Article, as well
as Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman and Balint for its support.
1. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
2. In re King, 136 P.3d 878, 880-81 (Ariz. 2006).
3. Id. at 881.
4. Id.
5. See id.; see also id. at n.3.
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thirty years following the shooting, King lived a decent,
ordinary life.6 He was devoted to his family, attended church,
went to law school, practiced law in Texas for ten years
without a blemish, moved to Arizona, and applied for
admission to the Arizona State Bar.' Nonetheless, in June
2006, the Arizona Supreme Court denied King's application
for admission.' In doing so, the court perpetuated a serious
injustice, an injustice mirrored by other state supreme courts.
B. The Injustice Explained
The court's decision was correct insofar as it denied King
admission to the bar because he was not able to provide the
kind of evidence necessary to establish that he had present
good moral character.9 Thus, on one level, justice was served.
On a deeper level, however, justice was not served. Prior
to King's application, the Arizona Supreme Court had issued
two opinions addressing the rights of persons with felony
convictions to practice law in Arizona: In re Arrotta, 96 P.3d
213 (Ariz. 2004) and In re Hamm, 123 P.3d 652 (Ariz. 2005).
The court's explanation of good moral character in those cases
was misleading because the court explicitly adopted one
standard while it utilized another. 10 Thus King was placed in
the unenviable (and unjust) position of being required to
prove his present good moral character using evidence to
meet a standard different from that which the court used to
evaluate his application." This injustice was exacerbated by
the King decision, In re King, 136 P.3d 878 (Ariz. 2006), when
the court, once again, expressed one standard but used
another. 12
The problem is that the court only implicitly understands
good moral character. 3 Philosophers have long recognized
that moral character can be measured at two levels-the
individual ("individual moral character") and the group
("group moral character"). 14 Individual moral character is
6. See id. at 881.
7. Id.; id. at 887-88 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
8. King, 136 P.3d at 886.
9. See infra Part V.C.
10. See infra Part IV.A-B.
11. See infra Part IV.C.iii-iv.
12. See infra Part IV.C.iii-iv.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part III.
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that (minimal) set of moral characteristics we expect of any
person living within our society. Group moral character is a
heightened set of moral characteristics necessary to be
admitted to a particular group.
The Arizona Supreme Court implicitly recognizes this
duality and uses both types to determine an applicant's moral
character. Yet, because the court only implicitly recognizes
this duality, it lacks the language or ability to express the
true standard. As a result, the court explains denials of
admission using the language of individual moral character
even when it denies admission because of a lack of good group
moral character. 15
This misunderstanding creates an injustice by providing
people who have a criminal past and aspire to the law with a
misleading rule that effectively prevents them from producing
the kind of evidence necessary to establish their current good
moral character. This injustice is made all the more severe
by the increasing number of Americans with felony
convictions and by the disparate effects that trend has on
non-whites and males.16 Furthermore, the misunderstanding
and the subsequent injustice occurs in bar admissions
nationwide.17
C. Correcting the Injustice
This Article is intended to deepen courts' and admission
committees' understanding of moral character and thereby to
guide them to a more just and reasoned basis for determining
whether persons with criminal pasts should be admitted to
the bar.
To achieve this result, the Article will proceed in four
parts. Part II is intended to inspire a change in
understanding by showing the potential injustice of a
misleading definition of moral character. Part III provides
the court with support, drawn from three millennia of
philosophical thought, showing that morality comes in two
kinds: group and individual. Part IV uses a trilogy of Arizona
decisions to demonstrate the problem in current decisions
about good moral character and explains the actual test the
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part VI.
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courts use in judging moral character. Finally, Part V shows
that the confusion is widespread.
II. THE GROWING STAKES OF MISUNDERSTANDING MORAL
CHARACTER
Applicants with criminal acts in their past often face a
heightened burden of proof of good moral character. For
example, in Arizona "[tihere shall be a presumption,
rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence presented at an
informal or formal hearing, that an applicant who has been
convicted of a misdemeanor involving a serious crime or of
any felony shall be denied admission."' 8 Previously, Arizona
required rebuttal by only a preponderance of the evidence.' 9
Furthermore, there is a rapidly growing percentage of
Americans with criminal pasts. The number of prisoners held
in federal and state prisons or local jails grew three times as
fast as the U.S. population from 2004 to 2005.20 More
18. ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 36(b)(2) (West Supp. 2007). Similarly, in Connecticut,
a felony conviction "creates a presumption of. . . lack of good moral character..
." REGULATIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE, ARTICLE
VI-11 (2007) available at http://www.jud.state.ct.us/CBEC/regs.htm (follow
"Article VI" hyperlink). A felony conviction is prima facie evidence of a lack of
good moral character in Indiana. INDIANA RULES OF COURT, RULES FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND THE DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS, RULE 12, SECTION
2 (2007) available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/addis/index.html#rl2.
In Ohio, a person convicted of a felony "shall undergo a review by the Board of
Commissioners on Character and Fitness" and can not be admitted unless (1)
"more than five years have passed since the applicant was released from parole,
probation, community control, post-release control, or prison if no post-release
control or parole was maintained," (2) "the rights and privileges of the applicant
that were forfeited by conviction have been restored by operation of law,
expungement, or pardon," and (3) "the applicant is not disqualified by law from
holding an office of public trust." RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR OF
OHIO, RULE I, SECTION 11(D)(5)(a) (2007) available at
http:/www.sconet.state.oh.us/Rules/govbar/#rulei. Under Utah's rules, if an
applicant has been convicted of a felony, then there is "[a] rebuttable
presumption . . .against admission." JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES OF JUDICIAL
Administration, RULE 14-708(f)(3) available at
http//www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/1407%2OAdmissions/USB 14-
708.html.
19. In re King, 136 P.3d 878, 882 (Ariz. 2006).
20. The numbers of prisoners held in federal and state prisons or local jails
grew by 2.7% from 2004 to 2005. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 2005 2 (Nov. 2006),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p05.pdf (last revised Jan. 18, 2007). The
U.S. population grew by only 0.9% from 2004 to 2005. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
POPULATION DIv., CUMULATIVE ESTIMATES OF POPULATION TABLE 2: CHANGE
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broadly, in 1974, 1,819,000 people had ever served time in
prison.21 This nearly doubled to 3,437,000 people in 1991 and
more than tripled to 5,618,000 people by 2001.22 To put this
in perspective, from 1974 to 2001, the U.S. population had
grown from 213,853,92823 to 284,796,887 24-an increase of
only 33%.
In addition, the U.S. prison population is not
representative of the U.S. population in terms of race or
gender. Black men are five times more likely than white men
to spend some time in prison,25 and men are ten times more
likely to be imprisoned than women.26
Because of the higher burden of proof, confusion over
what "good moral character" means (and how one shows it)
will have a disparate and unfair effect on persons with a
criminal past. In addition, non-whites and men will unfairly
shoulder this burden. As such, justice requires that the
courts clearly express what is required to show good moral
character.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN ETHICAL THOUGHT
JUSTIFIES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL
MORALITY
For three thousand years, ethicists have recognized that
a person's moral character can be judged at both the level of
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, AND FOR PUERTO Rico AND STATE
RANKINGS: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2005 (Dec. 22, 2005),
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2005-02.xls; U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU POPULATION DIv., CUMULATIVE ESTIMATES OF POPULATION TABLE 2:
CHANGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, AND FOR PUERTO RICO AND
STATE RANKINGS: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2004 (Dec. 22, 2004),
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2004-02.xls.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON STATISTICS (2003),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/piuspOl.pdf.
22. Id.
23. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION DIV., HISTORICAL NATIONAL
POPULATION ESTIMATES: JULY 1, 1900 TO JULY 1, 1999 (Apr. 11, 2000),
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt.
24. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION DIv., TIME SERIES OF NATIONAL
POPULATION ESTIMATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2001 (Dec. 27, 2001),
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/2000s/vintage-2001US-2001EST-
01.html.
25. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS BUREAU OF
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an individual and in the context of group membership. As
such, there is a considerable basis for the courts to explicitly
adopt a similar understanding of good moral character."
A. The Ancient Greeks and the Movement From Group
Morality to Universal Morality
Ancient Greek ethicists began the Western inquiry into
moral character by attempting to measure the moral
character of a person as a member of a particular group. For
Homer, the classical Greek author of the Iliad and the
Odyssey, 28 the principal type of moral character was group
moral character.2 9 For example, a person was "agathos"
(" "), the ancestor of our word "good," if that person had the
ideal qualities of a Homeric nobleman. 0 A person had "aret6"
(.. "), roughly "virtue" or "excellence," when that person
performed his or her "socially allotted function."3
Over time, the Greeks moved away from the morality of
members of particular groups and reframed the question to
how one measures the moral character of an individual as a
member of the universal group-all persons. In the period
following Homer, the Greeks began to interact more
frequently with other cultures.32  As a result, the Greeks
struggled to reconcile their idea of a universal moral code
with the existence of many different local moral codes.33 This
required Greek ethicists to shift from a focus on group
27. As noted above, individual moral character is the type of moral
character we expect of everyday people while group moral character is a
heightened set of moral characteristics expected of a person to join a particular
group. It is the premise of this law review that one can have individual moral
character while lacking group moral character. I have been asked whether the
converse is true: Can you have group moral character without individual moral
character? Assuming that what it takes to have group moral character is
determined by the group as opposed to society at large (whether this is true is
outside of the scope of this Article), then yes. For example, a scientist might
perform research in a manner consistent with the highest moral ideals of the
profession but be an abusive parent.
28. HOMER, THE ILIAD OF HOMER (Richmond Lattimore trans., The
University of Chicago Press 1951); HOMER, THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER (Richmond
Lattimore trans., Harper & Row 1975) (1965).
29. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 5 (2d ed. 1998).
30. Id. at 5-6.
31. Id. at 7-8.
32. See id. at 8-11.
33. Id. at 9-11.
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morality to individual morality. 34
For example, Plato believed that a person was virtuous
when that person's soul was just.3 5  Plato believed that the
soul had three parts: the rational (reason), the spirited
(feelings of anger, honor, and ambition), and the appetites
(desire for food, drink, and sex).3 6 For the soul to be just, each
part had to be performing its function and the three parts had
to be in balance (functioning harmoniously). 7 Similarly,
Plato believed that the polis ("7t") or city-state could be
virtuous. The polis consisted of three groups: rulers (who had
the virtue wisdom), guardians/warriors (who had the virtue
courage), and artisans/tradespeople (who had virtues that
best suited them to their art or trade).3 The polis was
virtuous when each of these three parts performed its
function and did so harmoniously.3 9 Thus, a person could be
just or virtuous when that person's soul was in harmony
(individual character) and when that person was acting as
member of his or her group in the polis (group character).
Aristotle also believed that people were virtuous on two
levels. For example, Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics
by stating "that ethics is a department of the theory of
politics" 4° and ends the Nicomachean Ethics by stating that
we can now begin our study of politics.41 For Aristotle, the
34. See id. at 9 ("Thus evaluative predicates come to refer to dispositions to
behave in certain ways relatively independent of social function.").
35. ROBERT L. HOLMES, BASIC MORAL PHILOSOPHY 65 (1993); PLATO,
Republic, in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 684-85, 814 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., Paul Shorey trans., Princeton University Press 1961).
36. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 66; PLATO, supra note 35, at 677-83.
37. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 66; PLATO, supra note 35, at 814 ("Then
when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not
filled with inner dissension, the result for each part is that it in all other
respects keeps to its own tasks and is just .... ).
38. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 65; PLATO, supra note 35, at 616-22, 671.
39. PLATO, supra note 35, at 683-84 ("But we surely cannot have forgotten
this, that the state was just by reason of each of the three classes found in it
fulfilling its own function.").
40. J. 0. URMSON, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 109 (Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1988);
ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1112
(Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., Random House 1941) ("Now our
predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps
best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the
question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability our
philosophy of human nature.").
41. URMSON, supra note 40, at 109; ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 1127
("Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established
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central difference between ethics and politics is that each
looks at a different aspect of man. In ethics we look at man
qua man (or individual) while in politics we look at man qua
citizen (or member of the group).42
Following the death of Aristotle, Greek moral theory
continued its movement toward a focus on the individual in
the context of the universal group. This period, the
Hellenistic period,43 arose as a result of the empire building of
Alexander the Great which caused the relatively small polis
to be overshadowed by the vast empire.44 As a result of this
shift of control from the local to the distant, the role of the
individual rose in prominence 45 while group membership
decreased in importance.6
B. Modern Ethicists and the Movement Toward the
Universal Individual
Modern ethicists completed this transformation by
expressing morality in terms of the anonymous, idealized
individual in relation to the anonymous, idealized and
universal group.
For example, according to Kant, each individual should
"lact only according to that maxim by which you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law."47 A
with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which
they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political
community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at
good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.")
42. See id.
43. The Hellenistic Age lasted, approximately, from the death of Aristotle in
322 B.C. to 31 B.C. 1 A. A. LONG & D. N. SEDLEY, THE HELLENISTIC
PHILOSOPHERS xi, 2 (1987).
44. See MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 100.
45. Id. at 100-01 (noting that "[ilndependence and self-sufficiency become..
the supreme values").
46. See id. at 100-03. For example, "Epicurus was perhaps the first
philosopher who made a clear, if implicit, distinction between justice as the
virtue of an individual and the justice of societies or legal order." GISELA
STRIKER, ESSAYS ON HELLENISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS 177-78
(Cambridge University Press 1996) (also noting that "this first attempt to
separate questions about virtue from questions about social justice did not lead
to an extended debate about the foundations of morality. The first installment
of that debate, which continues to this day, seems to have occurred in the
second century B.C.").
47. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 142; IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 69-71 (H.J. Patton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964)
(1948).
162 [Vol:48
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maxim is a rule that underlies an action. Thus, the only
acts that are morally permissible are those acts for which it
would be rational to want everyone to follow the rule
underlying the act: if, in order to achieve your goals, you
would need to make an exception from that universal rule for
yourself, then the act is not morally permissible. 9 In essence,
an individual should ignore his personality and imagine what
a truly rational individual-an anonymous, idealized member
of the anonymous, idealized, universal group-would do.5 °
Similarly, according to rule utilitarianism "[a]n act is
right if it accords with a rule the general following of which
produces as great a balance of good over bad for all people
affected as any alternative rule."51 Once again, we cannot
make a moral judgment without looking to the universal
group: all people. 2  At the same time, the particular
individual has been replaced by the universalized individual5 3
because we count everyone's good or evil (pleasure or pain). 4
C. A Three Thousand Year History of Two Types of Moral
Character
From the ancient Greeks to the modern period, ethicists
48. See HOLMES, supra note 35, at 140-142; see also KANT, supra note 47, at
68-69 n.*, 88 n.*. For example, if I am rational, then if I steal bread because I
am hungry, I should believe the rule that it is acceptable for people to steal
bread when they are hungry.
49. See KANT, supra note 47, at 91-92.
50. See KANT, supra note 47, at 95 ("Ends that a rational being adopts
arbitrarily as effects of his action (material ends) are in every case only relative;
for it is solely their relation to special characteristics in the subject's power of
appetition which gives them their value. Hence this value can provide no
universal principles, no principles valid and necessary for all rational beings
and also for every volition-that is, no practical laws."). To determine what this
idealized member of the universal group should do, the person must think about
what would happen if all the (idealized) members of that universal group did
what that person wanted to do. Id. at 101 ("A rational being belongs to the
kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he
is also himself subject of these laws. He belongs to it as its head, when as the
maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other.").
51. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 164 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER
WORKS, 1925-1953 280 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., SIU Press 1985).
52. JOHN STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS
142 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1991) (noting "that [the] standard
is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness
altogether").
53. See id. at 142; see also HOLMES, supra note 35, at 156-57.
54. Id. at 137 (noting that good and evil correspond to pleasure and pain).
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have recognized that a person's moral character can be
measured either at the individual or at the group level.
Consequently, there is a three thousand year long basis for
the court to do the same.
IV. A TRILOGY OF ARIZONA CASES ON MORAL CHARACTER
Arizona's recent trilogy of cases discussing moral
character in the context of applications for admission to the
bar by persons with felony convictions 5 demonstrates the
court's implicit recognition of group and individual moral
character, its use of group moral character in assessing
applications, its measure of good group moral character, and
its misleading explanation for its holdings.
A. The Arrotta Test-Setting the Stage for Confusion
Arrotta illegally charged the parents of a child who died
from a vaccination a one-third contingency fee, while
simultaneously receiving payment for those services under
the Childhood Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34
(1986).6 He also illegally paid a claims adjuster in Arizona's
risk management section over $400,000 for providing him
with confidential information about claims against the
State." In the end, Arrotta pled guilty to mail fraud, bribery,
fraudulent schemes and practices, and disclosure of
confidential information; 8 he consented to disbarment and
served one year in prison.59
Eight years after his disbarment, Arrotta was denied
reinstatement. ° In denying Arrotta reinstatement, the court
held that to be reinstated a disbarred attorney must show (1)
present good moral character, (2) knowledge of the law, and
(3) rehabilitation. 1 Ignoring the first two requirements, the
court focused its discussion on the rehabilitation prong and
concluded that Arrotta had not demonstrated rehabilitation.62
55. In re Arrotta, 96 P.3d 213 (Ariz. 2004), In re Hamm, 123 P.3d 652 (Ariz.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2300 (2006), and In re King, 136 P.3d 878 (Ariz.
2006).
56. Arrotta, 96 P.3d at 214.
57. Id. at 215.
58. Id. at 216.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 216, 220.
61. Id. at 216.
62. See Arrotta, 96 P.3d at 216-20.
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While Arrotta does not directly address good moral character,
its discussion of rehabilitation shows the court's implicit
acceptance of the duality of moral character, its implicit
understanding that group moral character counts, and its
over-reliance on individual moral character.
The court noted that a requirement of showing
rehabilitation is more than what is required of first-time
applicants to the bar. By explaining the additional
requirement, the court demonstrated an implicit
understanding that lawyers are members of a group that
imposes moral requirements on its members because of their
special place, power, and role in society. 4 For example, the
court recognized that a disbarred attorney "has . . . seriously
violated the trust placed in him as an officer of the court."
6 5
In addition, Arrotta "has revealed that, at least in some
circumstances, he poses a threat to members of the public."
66
Furthermore, the court stated that "[w]e must endeavor to
make certain that [we do] not again put into the hands of an
unworthy petitioner that almost unlimited opportunity to
inflict wrongs upon society possessed by a practicing
lawyer."67
Two points about good moral character underlie this
discussion. First, the court recognized that a lawyer's special
place in society gives the lawyer special power but with that
special power comes heightened moral requirements. Second,
the court applied this heightened moral character to itself.
68
While the court clearly understood that lawyers have
special group moral qualifications, it quickly shifted away
from group morality to individual morality by placing a single
requirement on Arrotta for readmission-that he show
rehabilitation.69  Such a showing required Arrotta to
demonstrate that he had identified the weaknesses causing
his prior bad behavior and that he had overcome those




67. Id. (alteration in original) (citing In re Piers, 561 N.W.2d 297, 300 (S.D.
1997)).
68. Each of these points is an unconscious recognition of group moral
character.
69. See, e.g., Arrotta, 96 P.3d at 217.
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weaknesses. 0
This is a shift from group moral character to individual
moral character because Arrotta only has to show that he has
overcome his individual problems. He does not need to show
that he meets the heightened moral qualifications for
membership in the group (including the very requirements
the court applies to itself) because the court has conflated
rehabilitation with individual moral character and individual
moral character with group moral character. While this
lowers the bar for Arrotta,7' it lays the groundwork for
confusion.
B. Hamm-Solidifying the Confusion
At the age of twenty-six, Hamm participated in the
murder of two men who sought to buy a large quantity of
marijuana from Hamm and his accomplices. 72  Hamm was
arrested, "pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder and
was sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of parole
for twenty-five years."73
During his incarceration, Hamm underwent a
remarkable change. He was a model prisoner who "completed
certificates in yoga and meditation,... helped fellow inmates
learn to read and write and to take responsibility for their
actions [and] . . . obtained a bachelor's degree in applied
sociology, summa cum laude, from Northern Arizona
University.17  While in prison he married and, with his wife,
founded a "prison and prisoner family advocacy
organization."75 Hamm was released from prison on parole in
1992 and received an absolute discharge in December 2001.76
In addition,
70. See, e.g., id.
71. Shortly after the decision was published, Arrotta returned with evidence
that he had identified his weaknesses and overcame them. See Dwight M.
Whitley, Jr. Hearing Officer 91, Hearing Officer Report & Recommendation 1-13
(Oct. 14, 2003) (discussing Arrotta's evidence); Disciplinary Commission of the
Supreme Court of Arizona, Disciplinary Commission Report 1-2 (2004)
(recommending that Arrotta be admitted). As a result, he was reinstated.
Arizona Supreme Court, Order of Reinstatement (2005).
72. In re Hamm, 123 P.3d 652, 654 (Ariz. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2300
(2006).
73. Id. at 654-55.
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[b]etween his release in August 1992 and his absolute
discharge in December 2001, Hamm performed thousands
of hours of community service. He advocated for
prisoners' rights in various forums by writing position
papers, appearing on radio programs, testifying in
legislative hearings, and speaking at churches, schools,
and civic organizations. He also appeared in a public
service video encouraging children not to do drugs or join
gangs.77
Finally, Hamm graduated from Arizona State University
College of Law in 1999 and passed the Arizona Bar
Examination in 2004.78
Given these basic facts, Hamm appeared to be the poster-
child for rehabilitation and, given the Arrotta opinion, it
seemed likely that the court would admit Hamm to the bar.
Yet, the court denied Hamm admission.79 It did so by shifting
the focus away from rehabilitation (which Hamm must show)
to good moral character (which Hamm must show
"independent of and in addition to" rehabilitation)."
In making this shift, the court once again failed to
distinguish between good group moral character and good
individual character. Instead, it found that Hamm lacked
"present good moral character" because of "Hamm's lack of
candor before the Committee and this Court, his failure to
accept full responsibility for his serious criminal misconduct,
and his failure to accept or fulfill, on a timely basis, his
parental obligation of support for his son."" In essence, the
court lumped all of Hamm's character flaws together under
the generic label of "moral character."
This is a mistake. Some of this evidence of Hamm's
character flaws is best described as falling under individual
moral character while other character flaws are better
understood as falling under group moral character. For
example, Hamm's failure to fulfill child support obligations82
and his failure to accept full responsibility for his criminal
misconduct 8 3 are evidence of personal failings or of a lack of
77. Id.
78. Hamm, 123 P.3d at 655.
79. Id. at 662.
80. Id. at 659.
81. Id. at 662.
82. Id. at 659-60.
83. Id. at 658.
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individual moral character. On the other hand, Hamm's
special knowledge of the law and special status as a person
seeking to join the bar make his failure to investigate his
legal obligations to pay child support, 4 his failure to report a
domestic disturbance on his character and fitness report,85
and his plagiarism in his pleadings to the court (and lack of
candor about this plagiarism)8 6 failings of group moral
character.
In addition, conflating these different types of moral
failings is a mistake the court should have recognized. For
example, the court noted the importance of Hamm's duty of
candor to the Committee on Character and Fitness, 87 as well
as his special knowledge of the law and the duties that arise
from it."8 These duties only make sense within the context of
group moral character. To lump them together with personal
duties is a category mistake.
At the same time, the court hinted at what it takes for a
person with criminal acts in his or her past to show good
group moral character. That person must make "an
extraordinary showing of present good moral character."8 9
C. In re King-The Bitter Fruit of Confusion
While the court's conflation of group and individual
moral character was "harmless" in Hamm's case because the
evidence indicated that Hamm lacked both good individual
and good group moral character, this confusion produced
bitter fruit in In re King.
1. King Nearly Kills Two Men and is Denied Admission
to the Bar
In 1977, after a day of heavy drinking, King shot and
gravely injured two men. 0 He pled guilty to one count of
attempted murder,91 was initially sentenced to seven years,
84. Hamm, 123 P.3d at 659, n.7.
85. Id. at 661.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 660-61.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 659.
90. In re King, 136 P.3d 878, 880 (Ariz. 2006).
91. Id. at 881.
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but was given "shock probation"92 after serving four months
in prison.
Like Hamm, King's life took a turn for the better after he
was arrested. During his probationary period, "King
underwent mental health counseling and group therapy.
9 4
King eventually entered law school, passed the Texas bar
exam, was admitted to the Texas state bar, and practiced for
ten years without a blemish on his record.95
In 2003, King moved to Arizona 96 and passed the Arizona
bar exam.9' King's initial petition for admission was denied
by the Committee on Character and Fitness, 9 although the
Committee eventually recommended his admission. 99
Nonetheless, the Arizona Supreme Court denied King
admission.
2. King Has Present Good Individual Moral Character
In the context of King's life after being released from
prison, this was a surprising outcome. The court stated that
King
appears to have been a model citizen in the almost thirty
years following his crime. He is a devoted family man,
happily married and successfully raising three children.
He is active in his children's Boy Scout groups and the
Chandler Christian Church, where he is involved with a
number of leadership groups and charitable programs. He
was similarly active in his church in Texas for an
extended period of time. 100
In addition, King appears to have had no skirmishes with the
law during the thirty years following his first arrest. 0 1 His
application was supported by fifty letters including letters
from "peers, colleagues, supervisors, friends, clients,
professors, clergymen, judges, and lawyers" each noting his
92. Id. at 881 n.3 ("The purpose of [which] was to stun the probationer with
the harsh realities of imprisonment, then release the probationer into society
with a strong impression of the consequences of crime.").
93. Id. at 881.
94. Id.
95. Id.




100. Id. at 887-88 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
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good moral character. 102
Thus, on the evidence presented, King demonstrated
good individual moral character. But that is the problem:
this evidence does not demonstrate King's good group moral
character.
3. The Court Claims to Reject King's Application
Because of a Lack of Evidence of Good Individual
Moral Character
While the court implicitly recognized that King had
presented only evidence of individual moral character, it
failed to make clear that it rejected him on the basis of a lack
of evidence of good group moral character. Instead, the court
focused on showing that King lacked individual moral
character. As discussed below, in the process, the decision
appears internally inconsistent and the Court appears to be
grasping at straws to defend denying King admission.
The court's first internal inconsistency arises in its
discussion of whether King had taken responsibility for his
crime. One the one hand, the court concluded that he had
not.1"3 It did so by interpreting King's applications to law
school, the Arizona bar, and to the court as minimizing his
personal responsibility for the shootings: in these documents
King explains why he accepted a plea of guilty rather than
fight the charge.1°4 The court went so far as to state that
"King expressed no remorse" to the court.0 5 In addition, the
court refused to take King's attempt at suicide, almost
immediately after the shootings, and guilty plea as evidence
of taking responsibility for the shootings on the ground that
the evidence suggested "King was as remorseful about being
caught as for shooting the victims."1 6
On the other hand, the court recognized King's
acceptance of responsibility and remorse by stating, "in both
hearings before the Committee, King admitted shooting the
victims and expressed remorse, calling the shootings 'a
mistake I made that I will carry with me for the rest of my
102. King, 136 P.3d at 888 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 884.
104. Id. at 883-84.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 883 n.10.
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life."' 10 7  Furthermore the court noted that "King
demonstrated his acceptance [of responsibility] by informing
judges, lawyers, law professors, former employers, and a host
of friends, acquaintances, and colleagues of his crime over an
extended period of time, impressing upon many of them
heartfelt feelings of remorse."08
Thus, the court believes both that King has failed to take
responsibility for his crimes and that he has accepted such
responsibility. This is both internally inconsistent and
nonsensical. Moreover, it can best be understood as the
court's effort to search for an explanation as to why it rejected
King despite the fact that it either did not understand, or was
not willing to admit, the true reasons for the rejection.
The second internal inconsistency arises in the court's
discussion of King's failure to remember the events
surrounding the shooting. Here, the court took King's failed
recollection of the events surrounding the shooting as
"suggest[ing that] he has not candidly assessed his actions on
the morning of the shootings." 0 9 Failing to candidly assess
one's actions when they lead to tragic results would certainly
demonstrate a serious lack of individual character. However,
the evidence before the court demonstrated that King was
highly intoxicated at the time of the shootings.110 King
admitted this and explained that he did not recall with any
accuracy anything that happened that evening."' While
blacking out or having decreased memory due to intoxication
implies a lack of restraint at the time, stating that you do not
remember something when you have a lapse of memory is not
a failure of candor. Once again, despite recognizing that King
failed to remember the events of that night, the court held
that he lacked candor about those same events. Once again,
this finding is internally inconsistent. As a result, we see the
court grasping at straws because it does not understand how
to explain why it must reject King.
The court's arguments that King failed to identify the
107. Id. at 883.
108. King, 136 P.3d at 883.
109. Id. at 884.
110. Id. at 890 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting) (noting that "[tihe arrest report
makes clear that when apprehended, Mr. King was intoxicated to the point of
incapacitation; he was so incoherent that the police officers were unable to read
King his Miranda rights").
111. Id. at 880 n.2 (majority opinion); see also id. at 884.
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weaknesses that caused his crime112 and to provide evidence
of overcoming those weaknesses' 13 have precisely the same
problem-internally inconsistent arguments about individual
moral character and the appearance of grasping at straws to
justify rejecting King.
4. The Court Actually Rejects King's Application
Because of a Lack of Evidence of Good Group
Moral Character
The court's arguments relating to individual character all
fail because in trying to reject King by saying that he is a bad
individual, the court tries to say something it intuitively
knows to be false. The court must resort to these arguments
because it knows that it must reject King but lacks the
language to express the true explanation for this rejection-
that King has failed to demonstrate evidence of good group
moral character. 114
The implicit importance of good group moral character to
the court made itself known at various points in the decision.
For example, the court noted that at the time of the shooting,
"King was a certified peace officer, employed as a reserve
deputy constable.""1 The fact that a certified peace officer
would violate his duties as a police officer by shooting two
men was an important indication to the court that King
lacked the kind of moral character necessary to be a peace
officer, 116 in essence, that King lacked, at least, one kind of
good group moral character. In addition, the court's reference
112. Id. at 884-85.
113. Id. at 885-86. A particularly problematic argument of the Court is that
King, for whom there is no evidence of alcohol addiction, failed to complete an
alcoholism program. Id. at 886. In addition, the Court considers Mr. King's
moderate use of alcohol (to no ill effect) during the thirty years after the
shootings to be troubling. Id. at 886.
114. Given the Arrotta and Hamm decisions, King really had no way to know
that he needed to show good group moral character or even what would count as
good group moral character. See supra Part IV A-B.
115. King, 136 P.3d at 880.
116. See id. at 882-83 (noting that "King inflicted serious injuries upon [the
victims] while holding a position of public trust as a peace officer"); see also id.
at 880-81 (noting King's "numerous hours of basic training," "patrol duties with
full-time officer," duties serving civil court papers, being "'passed over' for a full-
time deputy constable position," use of "his semi-automatic service revolver,"
that he was off-duty at the time of the shooting, and that there is some evidence
King was suspended at the time).
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to two cases holding that law enforcement officers and law
school graduates are held to higher moral standards indicates
that it is King's failure to meet these higher group moral
standards that lies at the heart of the court's rejection of his
application, 117 as does the court's recognition that "King
committed his crime while occupying a position of public
trust."1 85
Furthermore, the court focused on (what it believed to be)
King's lack of candor on his law school application, on his
application to the bar, and to the court.1 9 The court's
emphasis on this lack of candor12 ° demonstrates both that the
court recognized the need for applicants to a group to be
candid with the group's gatekeepers and that the court itself
was such a gatekeeper. 121 A failure to be candid with those
gatekeepers indicates that the applicant believes that if the
facts were known, the gatekeepers would find the applicant
lacking the moral qualifications necessary to join the group.
Because the court failed to show that King lacks good
individual character and consistently referred to group moral
character, we can only conclude that the court rejected King
because he did not present evidence of good group moral
character-despite the court's own failure to understand that
it was doing so.
V. MEASURING GOOD GROUP MORAL CHARACTER
As we have seen, the King decision, despite the court's
arguments to the contrary, can only be understood as refusing
King admission to the bar because he lacked good group
moral character. Once we recognize this, we can uncover the
court's test for such character.
Our first clue is provided when the court noted that the
worse the crime committed, the higher the burden on the
applicant to prove moral character. 22 In essence, the test of
117. See id. at 882-83 (citing Barlow v. Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360, 1366 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1990) and Seide v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 782 P.2d 602, 604 (Cal.
1989)).
118. Id. at 882 n.9 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 883-84.
120. Id.
121. See King, 136 P.3d at 885.
122. Id. at 882-83 (holding that "[tihe weight of the added burden of
demonstrating complete rehabilitation is determined by the gravity of the past
criminal conduct").
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good group moral character is a balancing test.12 3 Once a
person does something bad (e.g., commits a crime), that
person has put something on one side of the scale. To
overcome that bad act, the applicant must then put
something good on the other side of the scale.
King appeared to have done the latter, by having lived a
perfectly decent, ordinary life. But the court noted that
everyone is expected to live an ordinary life and that doing so
does not counter-balance a previous (serious) bad act. 124
Therefore, to counter-balance his attempted murder
conviction, King would have had to engage in some set of
affirmative, purposeful, positive acts, beyond those associated
with living a normal life, to offset the negative acts in his
past. 125
It is noteworthy that this is more than what we require of
people who have committed crimes to show that they are
perfectly decent individuals. Living thirty crime-free years,
being a good parent, adopting your spouse's children, and
being involved in your children's lives is more than enough to
convince nearly everyone that you are a good individual. But
because of the special role lawyers play in society and the
power their unique knowledge provides them, lawyers are
held to a higher standard.
In addition, the repute, in the public eye, of a profession
that dispenses and protects justice can be harmed by letting a
person with criminal acts in their past enter that profession.
To protect against any such disrepute and the harm such
individuals might wreck on the public, it makes sense to
require them to show a proportionate amount of positive good
acts. In this context, the court's balancing test can only be
seen as a test of good group moral character.
VI. ARIZONA IS NOT ALONE IN ITS CONFUSION
The Arizona Supreme Court is not alone in its confusion.
Many other courts require good group moral character and
123. Id. at 883 (noting that "King's misconduct tips the scales against
admission at the outset").
124. See, e.g., id. at 885 ("The mere passage of time without incident is
insufficient standing alone").
125. Id. at 883 ("King's misconduct tips the scales against admission at the
outset, thereby requiring him to produce an extraordinary amount or quality of
evidence to meet his burden of proof").
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apply a balancing test for good group moral character without
realizing they are doing so.
A. In re Hinson-Lyles
For example, we find echoes of the King decision in the
Louisiana Supreme Court opinion In re Hinson-Lyles.26
Hinson-Lyles "was convicted of a felony sexual offense in
199911127 for having sexual relations with one of her underage
students."' In 2003, after a character and fitness hearing,
the Commissioner recommended that Hinson-Lyles be
conditionally admitted to the practice of law. 129
In a relatively short opinion, the court denied her
admission without discussing any evidence relating to
Hinson-Lyles' current moral behavior. 130 The concurrence, on
the other hand, took care to note that there was considerable
evidence that Hinson-Lyles never denied responsibility for
her acts, led a morally good life before committing this crime,
was a model probationer, was remorseful, and understood she
had done wrong.13 1 In addition, there was evidence from a
psychologist identifying the cause of her conduct and that she
would not re-offend. 132 Finally, "[s]he is now married,
expecting a child, and by all accounts available, is functioning
as a normal young married professional." 133
With our analysis of the Arizona cases in hand, we can
see that the majority avoided discussing these bits of evidence
in favor of Hinson-Lyles because it felt compelled to reject her
admission, but did not know why. While there was
considerable evidence that Hinson-Lyles was living a normal
life and that she had present good individual character, she
provided no evidence to support her having good group moral
character.
The court implicitly recognized the importance of good
group moral character when it noted that good moral
character requires "observances of fiduciary responsibility."1 34
126. In re Hinson-Lyles, 864 So. 2d 108 (La. 2004).
127. Id. at 109-10.
128. Id. at 110-11.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 111-12.
131. Id. at 113 (Weimer, J., concurring).
132. Hinson-Lyles, 864 So. 2d at 113 (Weimer, J. concurring).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 111 (defining "good moral character" to include candor and
175
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Fiduciary duties are duties that arise out of one's position of
trust-precisely the position that a person undertakes when
they join a state bar (the group). Thus, the court recognized,
albeit unconsciously, that Hinson-Lyles must present
evidence that she can conform to the heightened moral
qualifications of a group. The implicit importance of evidence
of group moral character was reinforced when the court
pointed to the evidence of Hinson-Lyles' failure to do exactly
that when she was a teacher, occupying a position of trust
with requisite duties beyond that of non-teachers. 115
Unfortunately, as in the King decision, the court in
Hinson-Lyles never directly explained its underlying reason
for denying Hinson-Lyles admission.
B. In re Dortch
Dortch conspired with six people to rob a bank in order to
provide an infusion of cash for his failing business.'36 In the
course of the robbery, Dortch's accomplice shot and killed a
police officer.137 Dortch eventually pled "guilty to second-
degree murder, attempted armed robbery and conspiracy"
138 iand served fifteen years. As in Arrotta, Hamm, King, and
Hinson-Lyles, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
implicitly recognized and relied upon good group moral
character to deny Dortch admission. 139
For example, the decision acknowledged that Dortch had
present good individual moral character: "Dortch has been a
law-abiding citizen and lived a constructive life since his
release from prison, " "' was a model prisoner, became active
in his church, graduated from law school,' "was awarded the
Dean's Cup for outstanding community service," 142 "served as
"observances of fiduciary responsibility").
135. Id. at 112.
136. In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346, 349 (D.C. 2004).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 350.
139. Id. at 348. Importantly, the court also relies on the fact that Dortch is
still on parole to refuse to grant him admission. Id. at 362 ('We conclude that
so long as Dortch is on parole, he cannot demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that he is fit to assume the responsibilities and be accorded the
privileges of an officer of the court.").
140. Id. at 351.
141. Id. at 350-51.
142. Dortch, 860 A.2d at 351.
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an adjunct professor at the law school,"143 worked as a
paralegal, and became director of "a diversion program for
first-time juvenile offenders."144
But Dortch faced precisely the same problem found in
each of the opinions discussed thus far. He presented no
evidence of good group moral character. We must conclude
that this lack of evidence was vital to the court's decision
because the court rejected Dortch even though it listed the
evidence establishing that he had present good individual
moral character. 145
In addition, the court undertook a discussion of moral
character that fundamentally (and implicitly) relied upon
notions of group moral character. For example, the court
focused on the importance of the group's (the state bar's)
perspective in assessing Dortch's character when it stated, "it
is appropriate to consider the public perception of and
confidence in the bar when determining the fitness of original
applicants to practice law."'46 The court specifically noted
that such a perspective is built into the District of Columbia's
bar rules which require "that an attorney who has been
disbarred on account of misconduct and who seeks to be
reinstated must prove . . .'[that the resumption of the
practice of law by the attorney will not be detrimental to the
integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of
justice, or subversive to the public interest. 1 47  Thus, the
court unconsciously recognized that the group (the state bar)
had a right, and perhaps even a duty, to impose additional
(group) moral qualifications on its members.
We also see group moral character in the court's
acceptance of New Jersey's balancing test for moral
character.1 48 That this balancing test pertains to group moral
character is made clear when the court noted that it applies
to "the applicant's burden to dispel the concern that his or her
admission to practice law ... will [not] be detrimental to the
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 360.
146. Id. at 355 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Prager, 661 N.E.2d 84,
90 (Mass. 1996)).
147. Id. (quoting D.C. BAR R. XI, § 16(d)(2)).
148. See Dortch, 860 A.2d at 357 (accepting New Jersey's view "that '[t]he
more serious the misconduct, the greater the showing of rehabilitation that will
be required") (quoting In re Manville, 538 A.2d 1128, 1134 n.7 (D.C. 1988)).
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integrity and standing of the Bar."14 9
Furthermore, in assessing this balancing test the court
observed that "[m]erely showing that an individual is now
living as and doing those things he or she should have done
through life . . . does not prove that the individual has
undertaken a useful and constructive place in society."15° In
essence, the court of appeals agreed with Arizona's Supreme
Court that merely living a good, ordinary life does not offset
one's bad acts for the purposes of assessing group moral
character.
C. In re Krule
We can also see that the Illinois Supreme Court
implicitly accepted group morality when it denied Jerome
Krule admission to the Illinois bar.' In addition to providing
an example of another court that is confused about moral
character, 1 2 the Krule decision also brings the balancing test
into sharper focus and presents a clear instance of judicial
recognition of the problem found in Arrotta, Hamm, King,
Hinson-Lyles, and Dortsch.
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted a balancing test,'53
but noted that not all positive good acts, outside of the scope
of living a normal life, matter. Rather, an applicant needs to
demonstrate kind of good acts that are predictive of how an
applicant would act when the applicant was independent of
supervision and had to exercise the applicant's own
judgment. 5 4
In addition, the Krule decision provided a rare example of
judicial recognition of the problem expressed in this Article
149. Id.
150. Id. at 360 (quoting In re Cason, 294 S.E.2d 520, 522-23 (Ga. 1982)).
151. In re Krule, 741 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ill. 2000).
152. We can tell that Krule was denied admission largely on the basis of his
group moral character from the court's emphasis on the fact that Krule
committed his crime when he was "a licensed professional," and that "his
criminal scheme arose in the context of circumstances comparable to those with
which he would be faced as an attorney, evincing an inability on Krule's part to
carry out his professional responsibilities honestly." Id. at 264 (emphasis
added).
153. See id. at 263-64 (noting that "community service and achievements" are
used to assess an applicant's good moral character and that "the positive
aspects of Krule's application were still outweighed by the nature and gravity of
the criminal offense for which he had been convicted").
154. Id. at 264.
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when Justice McMorrow stated:
As I studied and pondered the majority opinion, one
lingering question always remained: What more could
petitioner have done that he did not already do to enable
him to be allowed the privilege to practice law? Stated
otherwise, is there anything petitioner failed to do to
justify refusing him a license to practice law. The
majority does not answer this essential question. 55
In essence, Justice McMorrow recognized that Krule should
not be granted admission, but does not see an explanation for
why he should not be granted admission.
We know that Krule should not have been admitted
because he lacked evidence of good group moral character,
but the court could not say so because it only implicitly
understood the importance of group moral character.
VII.MAKING THE IMPLICIT EXPLICIT
Applicants to the bar are judged on two bases: good
individual moral character and good group moral character.
Thus far, state supreme courts have implicitly understood
this, have applied this dual standard to deny membership to
people with no evidence of good group moral character, but
have only obliquely explained what they were doing. This is
manifestly unfair and unjust. It is made all the more unjust
because of its disparate impact on people with criminal pasts,
non-whites, and men.
Repairing this injustice is simple. The courts must make
the implicit explicit and bring their decisions in line with
three thousand years of ethical theory. The courts must
explain clearly and explicitly that an applicant with a
criminal past must show both that he or she is a good
individual and the type of person who should be offered
membership in a special group.
155. Id. at 267 (McMorrow, J., concurring).

